(At the invitation of The Lib-Dems Candidate for Wimbledon, Shas Shaheen, I met both Nick Clegg and Simon Hughes in July 2010 in the Commons and handed them this paper personally urging them to modify the terms of the AV referendum in time in order to secure the support of Labour reformers)
July 2010
1. The
Con-Lib coalition is a wonderful expression of the character of our political
traditions of compromise and practicality. It is a step on the road to
re-enforcing our representative democracy which has been smothered under
adversarial ideologies fostered by the FPTP System. This Coalition-Government,
unlike other governments for decades, is a majority government, elected and
backed by 59 % of the voters. However it
is based on a freak result that is unlikely to recur while FPTP rules in its present
form.
2. AV
in its simple form cannot change FPTP.
If at all it will reinforce and perpetuate it. It will definitely not
help the Lib-Dems. Indeed it will stifle their aspiration for reform. Gordon
Brown understood this very well when he adopted it as a sop to woo Lib-Dem
voters. In a similar fashion David Cameron grabbed it with alacrity to help him
to solve the last obstacle to form his Coalition. By declaring recently his
intention to campaign against AV in the referendum he showed his true colours.
But even a YES in a referendum on AV as it is now can achieve nothing in
redressing the imbalance between votes and seats in parliament. On the contrary
it will serve only to bury the case for reform for generations.
3. To
be effective AV has to conform to the way voters have been accustomed over the
generations to cast their votes. Voters are used to voting with one X for one
individual candidate that belongs to a party. Even an independent is deemed by
the constituent voters as belonging to a one-member party. Changing that will
result in even less participation as indeed happened at least in England both in
the elections for the European Parliament and the London Mayor.
4. Moreover
some MPs and many traditional Tories consider AV in its present form as giving
two votes to some voters but not to all those who want to stick to the
traditional one ballot to choose one individual candidate. So how to
proceed? The answer is simplicity itself. Instead of confusing the
busy citizen with a list of candidates to choose one and grade the others in a
long list of preferences the voter can choose his/her preferred candidate and
his/her party as is the case today. If that specific vote does not succeed in
electing the Constituency MP “CMP” in a simple majority that vote goes to that
candidate’s party and grouped and added together with such other unsuccessful
votes nationwide to elect a limited number of Party MPs “PMP” say a 20 per cent
of Parliamentary seats. At present the ratio would be 519 CMP + 130 PMP = 649.
The vote is not wasted. It stays with the “family”
5. The
adoption of such a modified AV will not only increase democratic representation
but it could bring about much wider participation of the electorate from the
recent low levels of around 60 per cent. In addition when this modified AV is
applied it can strengthen rather than weaken the status of Parliament and
Parliamentarians, lying so low lately.
6. By
substituting the long lists of graded preferences and passing on the
unsuccessful votes to the candidate’s party, this version of AV gives some
weight to the votes of unsuccessful candidates and brings fairness into the
electoral process. AV in this modified version preserves the Westminster model of FPTP for the
traditionalists and infuses it with a dose of PR to satisfy the innovators
ensuring a greater representation. Thus AV in this way carries out electoral
reform without an upheaval.
7. A
big advantage of this modified version of AV over other systems is its
flexibility; this makes it possible to introduce it gently without going
against the grain of our traditions where the relationship of the MP to his/her
constituents is sacrosanct. The British balk at revolution. This modified AV provides the evolution which
we all prefer. It retains the FPTP System with its backbone of the Constituency.
It simply modifies the FPTP slightly without drastically changing its advantage
in preserving the stability of
governments.
8. This
modification of AV is borrowed from another electoral system called TR Total
Representation. (A brief summary of it can be found on the Electoral Reform
Society website: http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/article.php?id=154 OR email AN.Post@btinternet.com
)
9.
The Lib-Dems’ zero option of “PR or nothing” kept
them for decades as a protest party. And so they would have stayed after the
recent elections. It is the failure of the Conservatives to gain those extra 20
seats that gave an unexpected opportunity to Nick Clegg. To his credit he
exploited it to the full. Now a door has been opened both to improve the
Lib-Dems’s present and future influence in politics. Politics is the art of the
possible. A bird in hand is better than five on the tree. If the Lib-Dems push
now for this modified version of AV and secure a YES vote in the referendum
they can at least be sure of achieving a partial reform that both big parties
could reluctantly swallow while giving the Lib-Dems the non-recurring chance to
double their seats in the Commons. Following is a simulation of the results of
the recent elections using this version of AV.
10. The PR
element of this version of AV gives an active role and leverage to the
runner-ups in the constituencies by keeping their hopes alive even in “safe
seats” They are given a chance to compete for a PMP seat at any General
Election depending on their level of support or wait for another round at the
next to fight for a CMP seat. Thus AV converts the rival runner-ups into
vigilant watch-dogs, monitoring the incumbent CMPs and guaranteeing their
constant accountability.
Simulation
using the data from the UK
General Election, May 2010
|
||||||||||||
Votes
|
Adjusted
|
Successful
|
Unsuccessful
|
PMPs
|
Total
|
|||||||
Party
|
Cast
|
Seats
|
CMPs
|
Votes
|
Votes
|
130
|
Seats
|
|||||
C
|
10,706,388
|
36.11%
|
306
|
47.15%
|
245
|
7,302,080
|
52.22%
|
3,404,308
|
21.73%
|
28
|
273
|
42.06%
|
Lab
|
8,601,349
|
29.01%
|
258
|
39.75%
|
206
|
5,000,922
|
35.77%
|
3,600,427
|
22.98%
|
30
|
236
|
36.39%
|
LD
|
6,827,832
|
23.03%
|
57
|
8.78%
|
46
|
1,231,743
|
8.81%
|
5,596,089
|
35.72%
|
46
|
92
|
14.18%
|
UKIP
|
917,175
|
3.09%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
0
|
0.00%
|
917,175
|
5.85%
|
8
|
8
|
1.17%
|
BNP
|
564,321
|
1.90%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
0
|
0.00%
|
564,321
|
3.60%
|
5
|
5
|
0.72%
|
SNP
|
491,376
|
1.66%
|
6
|
0.92%
|
5
|
88,352
|
0.63%
|
403,024
|
2.57%
|
3
|
8
|
1.25%
|
Green
|
285,616
|
0.96%
|
1
|
0.15%
|
1
|
16,238
|
0.12%
|
269,378
|
1.72%
|
2
|
3
|
0.47%
|
SF
|
171,942
|
0.58%
|
5
|
0.77%
|
4
|
102,290
|
0.73%
|
69,652
|
0.44%
|
1
|
5
|
0.71%
|
DUP
|
168,216
|
0.57%
|
8
|
1.23%
|
6
|
119,235
|
0.85%
|
48,981
|
0.31%
|
1
|
7
|
1.05%
|
PC
|
165,394
|
0.56%
|
3
|
0.46%
|
2
|
35,743
|
0.26%
|
129,651
|
0.83%
|
1
|
3
|
0.54%
|
SDLP
|
110,970
|
0.37%
|
3
|
0.46%
|
2
|
51,596
|
0.37%
|
59,374
|
0.38%
|
0
|
3
|
0.45%
|
UCUNF
|
102,361
|
0.35%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
0
|
0.00%
|
102,361
|
0.65%
|
1
|
1
|
0.13%
|
Eng Dem
|
64,826
|
0.22%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
0
|
0.00%
|
64,826
|
0.41%
|
1
|
1
|
0.08%
|
Alliance
|
42,762
|
0.14%
|
1
|
0.15%
|
1
|
12,839
|
0.09%
|
29,923
|
0.19%
|
0
|
1
|
0.16%
|
Ind.
|
21,181
|
0.07%
|
1
|
0.15%
|
1
|
21,181
|
0.15%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
1
|
0.12%
|
Others
|
408,502
|
1.38%
|
0
|
0.00%
|
0
|
0
|
0.00%
|
408,502
|
2.61%
|
3
|
3
|
0.52%
|
Totals:
|
29,650,211
|
100.00%
|
649
|
100.00%
|
519
|
13,982,219
|
100.00%
|
15,667,992
|
100.00%
|
130
|
649
|
100.00%
|
N.B. Total seat figures for DUP and SDLP appear
incorrect due to decimal rounding effects due to the need to create adjusted
CMP figures for simulation
|
||||||||||||
Revised CMPs based on 80% of
actual seats won; 130 PMP seats based on 20% of existing 650 common's seats
|
1.
This simulation
is for illustrative purpose. It assumes the ratio between CMPs and PMPs to be
80/20. It revised and recast the real May results to produce a 519 CMPs + 130
PMPs = 649 MPs
2.
In the first 4
columns the total figures and percentages of actual votes and seats are
tabulated. Total MPs is 649.
3.
The next three
columns adjust the total figures in accordance with the AV Modified System of
80/20 ratio of CMPs and PMPs. The total CMPs is 519 being 80 percent of 649.
4.
The next three columns show how the unsuccessful votes
are distributed amongst the parties to end up with the new PMPs Seats of 130 being 20 per cent of 649
5.
The next two
columns give the final number of MPs (CMPs and PMPs) of the new 80/20 total of
649.
6.
The balance between
Labour and the Conservatives stays the same with a reduction of seats. The
Conservatives keeps their first position to form the Government. Labour is the
second biggest Party.
7.
The Lib-Dems
double their strength to 92
8.
All other Parties
increase their representations but their influence is still kept to a
manageable minimum to avoid destabilising the Government as happens in pure PR
Systems’ countries.(e.g. Holland or Israel)
Aharon Nathan, Wimbledon, 10 July
2010